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Abstract
What are the economic, social and political effects when previously
isolated villages are opened to the outside world? Scholars from
different traditions expect different sorts of positive or negative affects to
occur. Rural China presents an ideal environment to study this question
empirically. Villages within rural China are in the process of being
opened to the outside world in different forms, such as through being
connected by road, the investment of agribusiness, or urbanization.
Moreover this opening is being driven and shaped by different actors,
including local residents, government and businesses. The different ways
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and actors that this opening occurs affect the nature of the opening, as
well as its impact on the economic, social and political characteristics of
the village.
Keywords: China, rural development, marketization
JEL classification: O13, Q12, Q15, R58
1. Introduction
Almost unconsciously, policymakers and even many scholars assume
that when isolated villages are connected to the outside world, the lives
and livelihoods of the locals improve substantially. Much of this is based
on economics – the new trade linkages, previously unimagined
employment opportunities, the ability to meet “needs” both real and
ascribed, the chance for electrification and media connections. But the
changes are far from merely material, and also include social and
political alterations. As they encounter “modern” cultures, aspirations
and even identities of individuals shift, groups morph, collectivities
change. Historically, theories emphasizing the dichotomy between
modern and traditional have represented a crude form of justifying
imperialism, colonialism and racist political systems – manifest destiny,
the White Man’s burden, apartheid just begin this kind of list. With the
advent of the Cold War, the approaches changed, though not the basic
functions. Former US President Harry S. Truman, cognizant of the need
to capture the hearts and minds of recently decolonized peoples before
the Soviets did, deepened the project of development. Western aid in the
opening and modernization of society was a part of this project. Even as
critics reacted to these attempts at “Western imperialism”, the project
remained the same. According to such ideas, the modernization and
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industrialization of the economy must be sourced indigenously through
each country and from each national movement – but occur it must.
Neither was this inherently a Western project. For centuries, China’s
emperors battled to bring the peoples at the periphery into the well-
institutionalized bureaucratic, Confucian state, with signification of
barbarians as a central goal. This project continued, though in different
forms, during the nationalist phase, as Republican leaders sought to
unify China’s various regions, including remote and often restive
regions. Mao Zedong, too, shared in this project. In his attempts to bring
revolution to China’s far-flung frontiers, Mao and the millions who
followed him focused on emancipating the minds of the backward “poor
and blank” both among the rural Han and to the official recognized
minority groups. While today’s leaders have rejected Mao’s orthodoxy,
they embraced and deepened his projects of modernizing China. This
agenda included connecting isolated areas, opening them to more
advanced areas.
2. The Impacts of Opening in Theory and Practice
What are the political and social changes that occur when an isolated
village is connected for the first time to the outside world? This project
pursues this puzzle by studying a series of villages in relatively remote
areas of China’s southwest. We selected for study villages that had
recently been opened to the outside through a variety of forms and
mechanisms. While each village is unique, we attempted to choose
villages that represented a different form of opening. To be sure, there
are many other forms of opening, as rural-based factories – both large-
and small-scale – are founded, as mines and oil wells are opened, as
dams and military bases are constructed, as migrants move to the cities
and return home to the village. However, this limited paper – part of a
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larger research project – focuses primarily on these three forms.
First, many villages in China have been recently connected to the
rest of China via roadway. While for millennia, even the most isolated
village was connected to the nearest marketing town by at least a
footpath. From its newly constructed highway trunk system reminiscent
of Eisenhower’s expansion of the US highway system, to improvements
of simple paths to humble dirt roads navigable by motorized vehicles,
Chinese governments at all levels from the mid-1980s have been
increasing, improving and enlarging roadway of all kinds. These have
brought millions of Chinese out of their traditional forms of “marketing
structures” (Skinner, 1 964) to face China’s greater market economy. In
many cases, newly constructed roads exposed villagers to government
programs designed to develop these areas. Second, many villages that
had long been proximate and integrated with China’s provincial or
prefectural cities find themselves being ingested by swelling cities. As
China urbanizes – an explicit goal of China’s policymakers – city
boundaries expand. Rural becomes urban, peasant becomes urbanite.
The expansion of cities of all sizes fundamentally alters economies, as
farmland is lost (often with compensation, sometimes with too little or
none at all) and often replaced with new, often unfamiliar economic
opportunities. Equally, urbanization involves political and social
changes, as social relations are newly formed or altered. Even simple
daily activities, from acquiring food to living in unfamiliar physical
spaces, to relations with neighbors, to work schedules with attendant
social adjustments, require adjustments. Third, the push by China’s
central and provincial government to promote the scaling-up and
modernization of agriculture opens villages and alters relations.
Traditionally, most farmers – especially from far-flung isolated areas –
have toiled for their own subsistence, selling any surplus at nearby
market towns. While China’s radical collectivization policies of the late
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1950s to the late 1970s altered family farms, subsistence farming
resumed – and was even codified as farmers gained usage rights over
tiny plots of land – in many areas. Today, with China’s policies of
agricultural modernization, Chinese farmers are entering into new
relationships with each other, with local, national and global
agribusiness, with retailers, with officials and policymakers, even with
government regulators. These relationships appear in different forms and
varieties, each of which shifts social and political relations. Thus, this
type of opening can benefit or harm farmers, depending on their nature
and form.
What can we expect from such opening? Social scientists have,
particularly beginning in the 1950s, debated this question, both in
general and in the context of China. Modernization theorists have, as a
group, generally argued that opening, while often a traumatic process,
brings changes that are on the whole positive. Socially, modernization
theorists focused on the fundamental changes people experience as they
shift from being “traditional” to modern. Talcott Parsons (1951 ) argued
that modernizing individuals and societies went through specific changes
in values, shifting from being affective, particularistic, collective-
oriented and functionally diffused to being more rational, universalistic,
self-oriented, achievement-based and functionally specific. Other
theorists focused on the secularization of the political culture and the
increasing complexity of social structures (Smelser, 1 964, Coleman,
1965). Economically, modernization theorists expect to see societies that
open themselves to the outside to experience a shift from basic,
traditional agrarian economy to a more complex, industrialized, high
mass-consuming one (Rostow, 1960). Politically, modernization
theorists have focused on the differing structures of government found in
traditional and modern societies. Many of these expectations are less
relevant to the Chinese case, which has in many periods had a relatively
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well-structured and institutionalized bureaucracy.1 Lipset’s (1 959)
argument that modernization leads to changes in attitudes and ideas that
facilitate democratization is more potentially relevant and testable. The
combination of urbanization, literacy, increased media consumption,
additional education and a rising middle class increases the number of
new opinions, enhances interest in politics and serves as a source that
inhibits state power. Combined with the fact that rural Chinese have for
years been participating in village elections that, though flawed, are the
most substantial and meaningful in Chinese history, the potential for
democracy-supporting attitudes remains at least plausible.
Many Chinese scholars have fit neatly into the modernization
paradigm. For instance, G. William Skinner’s (1 964) classic work on the
marketing structure of traditional rural life is motivated by an interest in
“change which constitutes departure from the traditional system”.
Lucien Pye (1991 ) looked to traditional Chinese attitudes and social
structures that, among other things, made democracy unlikely. The
reform period, which brought opening nearly unprecedented in Chinese
history however has strengthened and encouraged the individual,
altering and modernizing social and political institutions. A. Doak
Barnett and Ralph N. Clough’s (1986) research on the formers of
modernization carried within the post-Mao reforms are part and parcel of
this effort. Individual attitudes (Inkeles, Broaded and Cao, 1997),
technology (Bauer, 1 986), coastal cities (Yeung and Hu, 1992), central-
local relations (Hao and Lin, 1 994) and institutional change (Wang,
1998) are among the mechanisms posited for pushing China along the
path toward modernization.
Other social scientists have been more skeptical, arguing that
modernization sparked by opening has in fact been a largely negative
experience, harmful for the recipient. Dependency theorists have long
argued that opening of economies in general harm domestic economies,
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making them dependent on more developed and powerful ones (Dos
Santos, 1 970, Frank, 1969). Others, led by anthropologist Arturo
Escobar (1995), attack the very idea of development, arguing that the
concept is an ideology that justifies foreign interference, disempowers
local populations, and causes more harm than good. Instead, necessary
changes must emerge from the expectations of the people themselves, as
well as their own descriptions of their situation – this is the point at
which theorizing should start.
In China’s case, critics, particularly from the left, criticized Deng
Xiaoping’s reforms as having reversed the gains in building a socialist
countryside. To scholars like James Hinton (1991 ) and others, the
reforms including opening China to the outside could only be to the
detriment of China. In a different vein, other China scholars saw efforts
to open isolated provinces as primarily aiming to benefit China proper.
Political scientist David S.G. Goodman (1983), for instance, saw China’s
efforts in the southwest province of Guizhou as representing “internal
colonialism”. Yang Dali (1 997) and C. Cindy Fan (1995) both argue that
as the center taps the natural resources in inland and western provinces,
sending finished goods in return, the poorer more isolated parts of China
suffer. According to these scholars, the opening of these provinces
permits an exploitation that creates a permanent inequality, an argument
reminiscent of that of early dependency theorists, particularly Dos
Santos. Other scholars argue the opening of isolated parts of China,
through the building of roads opens local markets to outside
competition. Local farmers could not compete with lower priced goods
entering from neighboring counties as a result (Herrold-Menzies, 2005).
Various attempts to open parts of China to development has had a
negative impact on the vulnerable ecologies in some regions, due either
to development (Economy, 2004), construction of dams (Hayes, 2007),
agriculture (Muldavin, 2006), deforestation (Xu and Ribot, 2004) or the
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exploitation of natural resources (Taylor, 2005). Local cultures have also
been altered by some of China’s attempts to open isolated minority
communities to tourism (e.g., Oakes, 1 998). Indeed, a portion of the
increasing number of rural protests echoes such concerns (O’Brien and
Li, 2006; Mertha, 2005).
The validity of these positions has been subject to intense debate.
Modernization theory in particular is accused ofWestern-bias, and being
too evolutionary (Kohli, 1 986) and not based on history (Tilly, 1 975).
Critics also charge modernization theorists with ignoring the possibility
of decay (Huntington, 1 968) and being a disguised form of Cold War
ideology (Kesselman, 1973). These criticisms call into question the
validity of “modernity” and “modernization” as concepts useful for
social science research. Similarly, dependency theorists are also
criticized for their ahistoricism, their over-emphasis on structure, their
apparent excusing of responsibility of domestic and often rapacious
political leaders, its unworkable or often Pollyannaish policy
prescriptions, and its inability to explain the development that has
occurred in many developing countries (Smith, 1 979; Kohli, 1 986).
These dissenting contending views, and the criticism of them,
should be taken seriously. Nevertheless, in spite of the direct attacks on
their validity, it may be better to avoid making assumptions about the
validity of theories. Far better it would be to test these arguments
empirically. Many social scientists have studied these issues, often in the
abstract and in aggregate, looking at how larger societies have changed
in response to Western culture and systems. However, rarely have they
carefully examined changes on the village level in response to exposure
to the outside world.
Classic research on China has focused on this process through
intensive research in rural areas. As early as the 1930s, the celebrated
Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong (1939) undertook an intensive
On the Social and Political Effects of Opening in Rural China 617
CCPS Vol. 1 No. 3 (December 2015)
study of peasant life and culture during a tumultuous time in China’s
history, in the wake of the collapse of the imperial period and continuing
exposure to Western powers. Fei’s contemporary, economic historian
R.H. Tawney (1932), examined how the rapidly changing social forces
brought an opportunity to peasant revolutionaries, allowing him to
predict the upcoming Communist victory twenty years in advance. The
intensive study by Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz and their co-
authors (1991 ), meanwhile, involving 18 visits over a decade to a
“model” rural village in China, brought insights into the disillusionment
of rural peasants in the revolution that was to bring them liberation and
development. Since 1978, as China opened and reformed, it became
clear that many or most of the benefits were obtained by local officials,
while life in rural villages remained a struggle. Similarly, Anita Chan,
Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger’s (1 984) classic study of Chen
Village mapped the nuanced changes sparked by China’s revolution and
reform.
China is currently an ideal place to study the effects of opening.
Today in western China, large swaths of the countryside remain isolated,
unconnected to local towns except by narrow roads, not traversable by
automobile. The economies of these areas remain on the traditional,
subsistence level. While these villages are not completely cut off from
the outside world (they are connected, though tenuously, to China’s
political and social systems), outside forces have muted effects. The
opportunity to study these villages and the opening process is gradually
diminishing as these villages are being linked to the outside world. The
effects of this are poorly understood, and data vital to understanding the
tumultuous changes inherent to this process is being lost. What is needed
is a study of villages that are in the process of being opened, with
comparisons made before and after the village has been linked more
firmly with the outside economy, political system and society. While the
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available data does not as yet allow the adjudication of the debates
between modernization theorists and their critics, the study does provide
some insights.
3. Examining the Effects of Opening in Southwestern China
The present study thus focuses on three Chinese villages that are
experiencing openings of various sorts and through various impetuses.
All three are located in Honghe Prefecture, a complex and paradoxical
area located in the southeastern part of the southwestern province of
Yunnan. Honghe, like much of the rest of Yunnan, contains large
numbers of minority ethnic groups of various types, with about half of
the population being classified as non-Han. China’s State Council
designated seven ofHonghe’s 1 3 counties as poor either in 1986 or 1994
(one was subsequently dropped from this list). These counties are largely
located in the southern part of the prefecture, a mountainous area
featuring difficult farming conditions. The wealthier counties in the
northern part, however, are located in the prefecture’s tobacco-growing
belt. Indeed, Honghe is one of China’s main tobacco growing areas, and
has lent its name to one of China’s most famous brands of cigarettes.
Despite the government-mandated cuts in tobacco production, the
prefecture government is quite wealthy. Indeed, even as peasants a few
counties over living in grass huts eked out their subsistence on tiny plots
of land, the prefecture in the middle-00’s invested not less than RMB
800 million (approximately US$100 million)2 on a set of impressive
prefecture government buildings according to official statistics. Even as
the prefecture as a whole enjoys an average net rural income of RMB
2510 per capita, the disparity across the prefecture is alarmingly high.
Two counties are nearly 50 per cent higher than that average and four are
right around it. At the same time, the per capita net rural incomes of no
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less than five counties are 70 per cent of that average or below, with the
most modest at RMB 1205 per capita (Yunnan Statistical Yearbook
2008).
The three villages examined in this study are similarly diverse. One
was a relatively wealthy village located adjacent to the prefecture capital
ofMengzi. Mengzi, a county-level city, expanded greatly in the wake of
the decision to move the prefecture government there from the county of
Gejiu. As the prefecture government settled in, Mengzi shifted from a
medium-sized county town to an expansive prefecture capital. The
capital has expanded so rapidly that now the village under examination
is about to be overtaken by it. These external changes have been
channeled by a unique institution invented by the creative leaders of the
village. By contrast, the changes that are occurring in the second village
have come from a different source – a commercial one. An agribusiness
has invested heavily in that village, shifting it from its reliance on more
traditional subsistent family farming to a modern form of corporate
agriculture. The third village is a poor mountainous village that had been
recently opened up by concrete road. The road has also facilitated the
implementation of a set of government-led anti-poverty projects. Each of
these forms of openings has affected these villages in different ways. It
is to analysing these forms that we now turn.
The first village, within Weilan Town under Mengzi, is located next
to a major thoroughfare running out of Mengzi. As mentioned
previously, Mengzi is expanding. The entire administration region has
over 300,000 mu of land3, of which the city area now holds between
130-140,000 mu. Indeed, the county hoped to be upgraded to be a
municipality, but due to new central regulations largely freezing such
changes, it remains a county.4 The village itself contains 223 households
of 850 residents, over 90 per cent of whom are of the Yi minority ethnic
group. Most of the village’s younger members have already migrated out
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of the villages for positions outside. Some 300 such young residents now
work, mostly elsewhere in Honghe Prefecture, in service industry jobs,
such as security guards, salespersons in small shops, custodial services,
and so forth. Village leaders estimate such jobs net a modest average
income ofRMB 400 per month. Due in large part to the expansion of the
municipality, most of the village’s arable land has been appropriated for
urban development. Originally, the village had about 1936 mu of arable
land contracted to villagers (out of 2,430 mu total). The village has but
900 mu of land left, ofwhich 730 mu has been rented to others.
The primary crops still under cultivation include corn (used for
animal feed), peanuts, fruit and a small amount of rice. Most residents
buy additional food from local markets. Despite this tiny plot size, this
village is considered to be comparatively wealthy: the annual per capita
income of RMB 10,000 is much higher than most of the rest of the
prefecture. By policy, for every 100 mu of land that it appropriates, the
state returns 10 mu to the village as “reserve land” ( ), which can
be used for non-agricultural purposes.5 According to local officials, this
policy is unique to Mengzi. The company currently has 115 mu of
reserve land. Of these, 50 mu of land will be allocated to villagers on a
20 square meter per capita basis. The remaining 65 mu will be used for
development.
Among the 1000 mu appropriated, some went to the building of the
No. 1 Middle School of the county, some to an industrial park, some
used for road construction, and the remainder taken by the Jingxin Beer
Company, which rented approximately 100 mu from the village to build
a factory. The villagers considered the factory’s compensation of RMB
37,960 per mu to be inadequate, and a conflict between the villagers and
the company ensued. The middle school compensated even less, paying
only RMB 15,000 per mu for the land it acquired. These sums are
inadequate given that land is one major source of livelihood for these
On the Social and Political Effects of Opening in Rural China 621
CCPS Vol. 1 No. 3 (December 2015)
farmers. They not only rely on the farm for crops, but most farmers are
able to raise at least modest numbers of farms animals that they can eat
or sell. After their land is acquired, many farmers struggle to make ends
meet. The urbanization that is occurring around the village represents an
outside force about which the villagers can do little. Although the
village’s proximity to the expanding county has brought it some
additional wealth and outside work opportunities for its younger
laborers, the village residents there were uncomfortable about a number
of aspects of these changes. The conflicts with land compensation and
usage were especially a concern.
As a result, the village leaders established a unique institution to
channel these external forces. The village residents decided to establish a
shareholding company that controls the collective assets of the village
and manages the commercial developments of these assets. This idea
came up from a series of discussions among the village residents.
Currently, the company has 200 directors and 830 shareholders (nearly
the entire village population). The current Chairman of the Board (Mr
Wang, who attended this meeting) was the former vice-director of
Wenlan Town. The company’s board of directors is the same as the
village committee. All members are elected by villagers as per the
election law. The professional managerial staff members, however, were
hired from outside the village. Currently, the company had a registered
capital of RMB 5.57 million. Each share is worth of RMB 6,666. The
registered capital is all collective assets. Each resident of the village has
one share.
The company is the first of its kind in the prefecture. The majority
of its starting capital comes from compensation for land appropriation.
The establishment of the company allows the village’s remaining land be
managed more strategically with a longer-term vision to the benefit of
the shareholders. The company has big plans. For one, it plans to rent
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400 mu of land from villagers to establish a tourist site – a recreational
farm that has vegetable greenhouses. For this project, the villagers will
receive a land rental fee of RMB 1 ,500 each year, in addition to the
dividends from their shares. The tourist site, it is hoped, will generate
local employment opportunities. Thus, if villagers are employed by the
farm, they will also receive wages. The company also hopes to construct
a “World Family New Village” ( ) on the village’s reserve
land, as well as a new residential area modeled after the “new
countryside” ( ) concept. This area will feature new modern
houses for villagers, as well as facilities for tourism and recreation. In
addition, the company hopes to start a real estate development by using
the reserve land returned during state land appropriation to construct
houses for commercial sale. The company projects revenues in excess of
RMB 7 million. Finally, the company plans to build a factory for the
processing, packaging and storing of vegetables in Gejiu City.
While urbanization started, this village was similar to neighboring
villages in terms of level of development and income, but after the
establishment of the company, the gap is increasing. Other villages are
also emulating its model. In the past, this was a poor village because of
water scarcity. Women from outside were not willing to marry into this
village. But this trend has now reversed. Thus, the village has not only
become wealthier through this idea, but its social status has also
increased.
The second village studied, Yihao Village (translated as #1 Village,
“Number one village”) within Caoba Town under Mengzi, is a relatively
recent settlement. According to local authorities, the town was created in
1936 by an official in the Nationalist provincial government who headed
a reclamation project that drained the wetland here and opened up new
arable land. Caoba Town as a whole has a total area of 136.9 square
kilometers, with 210,000 mu of arable land, more than three quarters of
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which is flat (much of the prefecture’s land is marred by hills and
mountains) and fertile. The population includes various minority ethnic
groups, including Yi, Zhuang, Han and Hui. The town has the highest
income in the county, with per capita income in 2008 reaching RMB
3,710. Some villages have per capita income exceeding RMB 5,000. The
original residents of the #1 Village migrated from the tin mines in Gejiu.
The fact that these were the first wave ofmigrants to settle here gave the
village its moniker of “#1 Village”. Nearly all (98 per cent) of the
village’s population is Han. The village has 1800 mu of arable land:
1 ,000 mu of fruit trees and 500 mu of greenhouse vegetables.
Agriculture is the strength of the town as a whole. In addition to its
flat, fertile land, the town has a good infrastructural base, especially
regarding irrigation. The water reserves of the town are especially
abundant, with sufficient ground water and two reservoirs. Prior to 1996,
the crop for the summer rotation had been rice. Local residents in 1996
began diversifying into corn as well as vegetable production, mainly hot
peppers, in greenhouses. Now, the main commercial crops are fruits
(loquat and pomegranate) and vegetables (in greenhouses, mainly
cucumbers and tomatoes). Thus the natural conditions of the town make
agriculture a strong sector for the town. This is also the perfect
environment to attract agribusiness. The Lutong Company established a
production base in Caoba. Like many agribusiness firms operating in
rural China, Lutong has encouraged contract farming (Zhang and
Donaldson, 2008). Accordingly, it provides technical services and
training to farmers, and purchases their harvest when done at a contract
price. In 2006, in cooperation with the Lutong Company, 600 steel-
cement greenhouses were built in the area. The #1 Village was a pioneer
in Caoba Town in this regard. The first 329 greenhouses built by Lutong
Company were in this village. It has also been officially designated as a
“model village” by the town.
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Lutong also introduced a variety of vegetable known as “stone
tomato” from Israel, which can endure long period of transportation and
storage and can stay fresh for over a month. The company sells its
tomatoes to Vietnam. This new variety of tomato pushed out the local
variety in the market with its low price. Lutong has 2000 mu of land
under production by faming households. The company itself has an
additional 1 50 mu of land, which is used as its base. Fruits produced
here are sold all over the country and to parts of Southeast Asia through
wholesale centers. The local pomegranate is a specialty. The CITIC
group is now investing hundreds of millions of yuan6 to build a
pomegranate processing factory in Xin’ansuo town to produce
pomegranate juice. The county also has the plan to build a “million-mu
pomegranate production base”, which will be the largest in the country.
The local weather provides the perfect conditions for growing
pomegranate: the annual average temperature is 1 8 degrees centigrade,
with long exposure of sunlight and a short frost period, according to
local government and company officials.
These private initiatives have also sparked additional government
investment. The prefectural government has the plan to build 10,000 mu
of steel and cement greenhouses in Caoba town over the next five years.
Each greenhouse (one mu in area) requires a total of RMB 11 ,000-
14,000 in investment. For each greenhouse, the prefectural and county
governments together will subsidize RMB 4,000, while the farmers are
responsible for the rest. Prefectural and county governments will also
invest in the upgrading of roads and irrigation facilities in Caoba.
Investment on these items will be between RMB 150 and 160 million.
Thus, the total investment in Caoba will exceed RMB 200 million.
According to local officials, the investment by Lutong began the
area’s transition from traditional to modern and capital-intensive
agriculture, as villagers interact with company officials, and begin the
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transition from subsistence to more scaled-up production. Thus while the
first village’s transition was sparked by an attempt to channel the forces
of urbanization, the transition in this case was mainly initiated by private
industry.
Government initiatives are the main spark behind the opening up of
the third village, a relatively poor village in a mountainous area of
Xibeile Township within Mengzi. The township is 200 square kilometers
in area. It is bordered to the south by Wenlan Town, on the west by
Caoba Town, and on the north by Kaiyuan Municipality. The average
altitude in this mountainous region is 2015 meters. Land in the township
is poor, with a thin layer of topsoil, lacking in trees and natural sources
of water. The entire township has a population of 8,890 residents within
1 ,996 households. Most (95 per cent) are members of ethnic minorities,
primarily Yi (72 per cent) and Miao (15 per cent). The per capita income
in the township is a modest RMB 1 ,030. For 2008, the annual revenue
for the entire town was RMB 2.26 million. The township only has a
roster of 32 cadres.
Although the natural conditions of the township make agriculture
difficult, the underdeveloped township nevertheless relies on this sector.
The pillar for the local revenue is tobacco. Tobacco production started in
2004, when there was only 86 mu. Now the township has 7000 mu of
tobacco. However, the development of tobacco is limited by the central
quota from the government. The township also has 17,000 mu ofwalnuts
and 4,000-5,000 hogs, and 5000 mu of plums, 3000 mu of apple. Their
current plan for development includes opening up land for: 20,000 mu of
walnuts, 1 0,000 mu of tobacco, 1 0,000 mu each of plum and apple trees,
and 10,000 hogs.
Within this town, Dougu Village had been connected with the rest of
the area by a recently completed concrete road, which has facilitated the
anti-poverty efforts of the government. The small village has 370
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residents within 80 households. According to the village party secretary,
only 12 residents went outside the village to work, four migrating to
Kunming (the provincial capital) and eight to Mengzi. The village
houses a small primary school with three grades, holding teachers and 20
students. The village is not far from larger urban areas, being 10
kilometers from both the township and the county seat, but the
mountains made this journey long and difficult. The village only has 677
mu of arable land. Most is used to grow corn. The harvested corn is then
used to barter for rice (one kilogram of corn for one-half kilogram of
rice). The average subsistence grain is 470 kilograms (above the poverty
line of 350 kg). The rest of the village’s land is on mountain slope and
can only be used to grow fruit trees, primarily plums and peaches.
Over the years, higher levels of government have invested RMB
145,000 to upgrade the facilities in this village. The funds were used to
construct water tanks for villagers. Currently, all households have at
least a tank of eight cubic meters; 35 households have 24-cubic-meter
tanks. Each water tank costs RMB 3,500 to build. Government organs at
various levels subsidize RMB 1 ,500 each, with the residents responsible
for the remainder. Some 77 households in the village also have biogas
tanks, which cost RMB 1 ,500 to build one. The government provides
material free of charge, with residents providing the labor. These biogas
tanks convert human and animal waste into gas used for electricity and
cooking, which has helped to power the village’s electricity needs in an
environmentally friendly manner.
4. Analysis and Conclusions
Each of the three villages represents a different example of rural
adjustment in response to the opening to the outside world. In the case of
Weilan Village, their access to the outside world was caused by rapid
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urbanization that threatened their livelihood. In response, the villagers
formed a shareholding company designed to safeguard their rights and
ensure the maximization of compensation from when the inevitable
occurs and their land is confiscated for urbanization. In the second,
villagers were brought closer to more densely settled communities when
they were moved to Yihao Village from more remote locations. In that
case, an outside company provided an impetus for them to become
contract farmers. In the third case, the construction of a concrete road
linked villagers of Dougu Village to more distant markets. Tobacco was
a mixed blessing for these villagers, but government investment brought
additional benefits to the villagers.
From these cases, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First,
while economists often refer to the benefits of opening in general, the
variety of forms in which this takes leaves open the possibility of the
variety of effects – positive and negative – from different forms of
opening. For decades, China has been focusing on linking rural villages
by roads to their nearest marketing towns and townships. While Mao’s
administration between 1949 and 1976 focused on this effort, the
subsequent reform period was especially successful at this effort. Part of
this effort has brought electrification to villages, and with it access to
media such as radio and television. More recently, even the most remote
rural town or township seems to be connected to the Internet, with at
least one Internet café, usually populated by a handful of young people
playing video games with others connected via the Internet. The
reformist government sought to temper the tide of migration in part by
urbanizing sections of the countryside, as well as by expanding urban
areas. With this urbanization, entire villages have been swallowed up,
not only shifting the land from agricultural to industrial or residential
use, but also transferring millions of residence permits from rural to
urban. Throughout the countryside, dams have been constructed, tourist
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villages have opened, and factories have been established. Agribusiness
companies have become increasingly active in the production,
distribution and marketing of agricultural products of all kinds. The
return of migrants who came back from the cities to work have also
brought with them capital, experience and know-how. Many encourage
others to migrate. Others stay to set up factories or shops. The forms of
opening are legion.
Moreover, each of these forms has also been facilitated by different
actors. The reform and opening period has created a misperception on
the part of some overseas-based China watchers that the role of the state
in China has shrunk (Nee, 1 996; Perkins, 1 991 ; Zhou, 1996). While the
role of the state has indeed shifted, the Chinese government remains
extraordinarily active in the Chinese economy. Thus it is not surprising
that government initiative remains a force for opening, such as in the
case of the third village. In addition, market actors, be they local,
national or global, have also been important for this opening. These
include those who have set up smaller-scale town and village enterprises
(TVEs) within the Chinese countryside in the early days of the reform
and opening period, agribusinesses who are entering into a number of
relationships with direct producers, as well as larger-scale factories.
Sometimes these entrepreneurs are locals – often government officials-
turned-entrepreneurs, or regional actors; others have come from
wealthier parts of China, been part of the Chinese Diaspora, or are
outside actors such as multinational corporations. Thus it is no surprise
that firms that rely on agricultural production like Jingxin Beer (for the
first village) or agribusinesses involved in production, such as Lutong
(for the second) have played important roles. For good or ill, these
businesses have been crucial in the opening of the countryside.
International organizations and non-governmental organizations, both
local and international, can also help to open up areas of the countryside
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by building schools, roads, or assisting in agricultural productivity.
Individuals, such as the residents of the first village who have
established their own shareholding company, are also important and
often overlooked. This indicates that it is erroneous, as much of
modernization theory implies, to dismiss locals as mere recipients; they
should be considered as actors in their own right. Despite the fact that
many of the instances are openings involve forces that are out of the
control of many local actors, innovative residents can create institutions
that shape these forces. This case also underscores the importance of
land usage rights, for without this institution, the residents would have
little or no basis on which to establish this vital shareholding
organization, which has served as the backbone of their bargaining
power in negotiating with government and businesses. Despite the
myriad reports of land grabs, this shareholding organization serves as
evidence that the norm of the land usage rights remains relatively strong,
and respect for it, even among powerful actors, remains the rule, rather
than the exception (Zhang and Donaldson, 2013).
In sum, the evidence from these three cases underscores the
importance of institutions in smoothing the potential trauma that comes
with opening, and allowing residents facing a novel situation to take
advantage of new opportunities while reducing the costs and risks that
come with the new environment. These institutions include these land
use rights that allowed farmers in one case to establish a shareholding
company and compelled agribusinesses to sign contracts with farmers in
another. Government programs created the opportunity for farmers to
move from remote areas, and helped to support other farmers with
improved roads and upgrading other key facilitates. The push to
encourage the participation of agribusiness has created more
opportunities for many farmers to move away from subsistence
production to more lucrative forms of farming. On the other hand, other
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institutions – such as the restrictions placed on tobacco farmers – retard
farmers’ ability to benefit from this otherwise lucrative cash crop. More
broadly, the institutions that created the “urban fever” stimulated the
urbanization that threatened to swallow Weilan village. These incentives
for urbanization can be both personal financial benefits – asset
investment can provide opportunities for corruption – as well as
increased possibility of promotion based on generating the kind of GDP
growth that only cities seem to provide. What does this mean for the
advocates and critics of opening? The evidence provided here is
consistent with the idea that if opening is conducted carelessly – in ways
that undermine farmers’ previous survival strategies and without
establishing institutions that facilitate their transition to new strategies –
the critics of opening are often correct, as opening creates more harm
than good. On the other hand, with institutions that protect against such
harms, opening facilitates the farmers’ ability to participate in
opportunities thus generated. Hence, adjudicating between the theories
on the different effects of opening is contingent upon how the opening
occurs and what institutions surround that opening.
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1 . In spite of this, China has long struggled with balancing the desire
to decentralize control in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of decision-making with the centralizing instincts of a government
determined to keep the empire unified against the often restive regions and
ambitious local officials (Fitzgerald, 2002; Chung and Lam, 2009).
2. A “yuan” of China’s currency reminbi (“people’s currency”) is equivalent
to about US$0.1 57.
3 . 1 mu ( ) = 0.0667 hectares.
4. For more details, background and the significance of this, see Chung and
Lam (2004).
5. Otherwise, the use of rural land is normally strictly controlled and limited
to agriculture.
6. See note 2 above.
References
Barnett, A. Doak and Ralph N. Clough (1986). Modernizing China: Post­Mao
reform and development. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Bauer, E.E. (1 986). China takes off: Technology transfer and modernization.
Seattle: University ofWashington Press.
Chan, Anita, Richard Madsen and Jonathan Unger (1984). Chen village under
Mao and Deng. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.
On the Social and Political Effects of Opening in Rural China 633
CCPS Vol. 1 No. 3 (December 2015)
Chung, Jae Ho and Tao-Chiu Lam (2004). China’s “city system” in flux:
Explaining post-Mao administrative changes. The China Quarterly, Vol.
1 80, pp. 945-964.
Chung, Jae Ho and Tao-Chiu Lam (eds) (2009). China’s local administration:
Traditions and changes in the sub­national hierarchy. London: Routledge.
Coleman, James S. (1 965). Education and political development. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Dos Santos, Theotonio (1970). The structure of dependence. American
Economic Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 231 -236.
Economy, Elizabeth (2004). The economic explosion and its environmental
cost. Chapter 3 in: The river runs black: The environmental challenge to
China’s future. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 59-90.
Escobar, Arturo (1995). Encountering development: The making and unmaking
of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fan, C. Cindy (1995). Of belts and ladders: State policy and uneven regional
development in post-Mao China. Annals of the Association of American
Geographers, Vol. 85, No. 3, pp. 421 -449.
Fei, Xiaotong (1939). Peasant life in China. London: Routledge.
Fitzgerald, John (2002). The province in history. In: John Fitzgerald (ed.),
Rethinking China’s provinces. New York: Routledge, pp. 11 -40.
Frank, Andre Gunder (1969). The development of underdevelopment. Monthly
Review, Vol. 1 8, No. 4, pp. 1 7-31 .
Friedman, Edward, Paul G. Pickowicz and Mark Selden (1991 ). Chinese
village, socialist state. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Goodman, David S.G. (1 983). Guizhou and the People’s Republic of China:
The development of an internal colony. In D. Drakakis-Smith and S.
Williams (eds), Internal colonialism: Essays around a theme. Monograph
No. 3. London: Institute ofBritish Geographers, pp. 1 07-124.
Hao, Jia and Zhimin Lin (1994). Changing central­local relations in China:
Reform and state capacity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
634 Housi Cheng, Q. Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 1(3) ♦ 2015
Hayes, John Patrick (2007). The recent environmental history of Tiger Leaping
Gorge: Environmental degradation and local land development in northern
Yunnan. Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 1 6, No. 52, pp. 499-516.
Herrold-Menzies, Melinda (2005). Caohai Nature Reserve and infrastructure
development: Why the impacts of a nature reserve’s infrastructure projects
apparently outweigh those of China’s Western Development Project.
Honolulu, HI: International Studies Association.
Hinton, William H. (1991 ). The privatization of China: The great reversal.
London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.
Huntington, Samuel (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Inkeles, Alex, Montgomery Broaded and Zhongde Cao (1997). Causes and
consequences of individual modernity in Mainland China. The China
Journal, Vol. 37, pp. 31 -64.
Kesselman, Mark (1973). Order or movement? The literature of political
development as ideology. World Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1 , pp. 1 39-1 54.
Kohli, Atul (1 986). The State and development in the Third World. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Lipset, Seymour (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic
development and political legitimacy. American Sociological Review, Vol.
53, pp. 69-105.
Mertha, Andrew C. (2005). China’s “soft” centralization: Shifting tiao/kuai
authority relations. The China Quarterly, Vol. 1 84, pp. 791 -810.
Muldavin, Joshua (2006). The environmental and social outcomes of China’s
reforms: Challenges to State legitimacy. In: Major internal challenges
facing the Chinese leadership, “Panel III: China’s internal unrest: Worker
demonstrations, civil disobedience, riots and other disorder, and the
prognosis for the future”. Published Congressional Hearing including
Testimony, Prepared Statement, and Discussion before the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, One Hundred Ninth
On the Social and Political Effects of Opening in Rural China 635
CCPS Vol. 1 No. 3 (December 2015)
Congress of the United States of America, First Session, February 2-3,
2006, pp. 92-99, 1 06-127.
Nee, Victor (1996). The emergence of a market society: Changing mechanisms
of stratification in China. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 1 01 , No. 4,
pp. 908-949.
O’Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li (2006). Rightful resistance in rural China.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oakes, Tim (1998). Tourism and modernity in China. London and New York:
Routledge.
Parsons, Talcott (1 951 ). The social system. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.
Perkins, Dwight (1991 ). China’s economic policy and performance. In:
Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (eds), Cambridge history of
China: Vol. 15, The People’s Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the
Chinese revolutions, 1966­1982. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 475-539.
Pye, Lucian W. (1991 ). The State and the individual: An overview
interpretation. The China Quarterly, Vol. 1 27, pp. 443-466.
Rostow, W.W. (1960). Stages of economic growth: A non­communist manifesto.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, G. William (1964). Marketing and social structure in rural China (part
I). Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1 , pp. 3-44.
Smelser, Neil (1 964). Towards a theory of modernization. New York: Basic
Books.
Smith, Tony (1979). The underdevelopment of development literature: The case
of dependency theory. World Politics, Vol. 31 , No. 2, pp. 25-67.
Tawney, R.H. (1 932). Land and labour in China. London: Allen & Unwin.
Taylor, John G. (2005). Environment-poverty linkages: Managing natural
resources in China. Chapter 4 in: Stephen Bass, Hannah Reid, David
Statterthwaite and Paul Steele (eds), Reducing poverty and sustaining the
environment. London: Earthscan.
636 Housi Cheng, Q. Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations:
An International Journal 1(3) ♦ 2015
Tilly, Charles (1975). Western state-making and theories of political
transformation. In: Charles Tilly (ed.), The formation of national states in
Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Wang, Fei-ling (1998). Institutions and institutional change in China:
Premodernity and modernization. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Macmillan.
Xu, Jianchu and Jesse C. Ribot (2004). Decentralisation and accountability in
forest management: A case from Yunnan, southwest China. European
Journal of Development Research, Vol. 1 6, No. 1 , pp. 1 53-173.
Yang, Dali (1 997). Beyond Beijing: Liberalism and the regions in China.
London and New York: Routledge.
Yeung, Yue-man and Xu-wei Hu (1992). China’s coastal cities: Catalysts for
modernization. Honolulu, HI: University ofHawaii Press.
Zhang, Forrest and John A. Donaldson (2013). China’s agrarian reform and the
privatization of land – A contrarian view. Journal of Contemporary China,
Vol. 22, No. 8, pp. 255-272.
Zhang, Forrest Q. and John A. Donaldson (2008). The rise of agrarian
capitalism with Chinese characteristics: Agricultural modernization,
agribusiness and collective land rights. The China Journal, Vol. 60, pp. 25-
48.
Zhou, Kate Xiao (1996). How the farmers changed China: Power of the people.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
